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Milczakowski: Pretrial Release for Undocumented Immigrants in United States v.

PRETRIAL RELEASE FOR UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS IN UNITED STATES V. FLORES: THE BAIL
REFORM ACT LEAVES NO ROOM FOR DEBATE
BY: HAYLEY C. MILCZAKOWSKI
INTRODUCTION
There has been a surge in deportations and arrests of undocumented immigrants under the Trump administration.1 In February 2017, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) expanded immigration enforcement guidelines
in compliance with an Executive Order issued by President Trump. 2 The
policy included a directive to focus on removable aliens who "have been
charged with a criminal offense that has not been resolved." 3 In the 2018
fiscal year, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reported a thirteen
percent increase in deportations, and an eleven percent rise in arrests. 4 The

increase in immigration enforcement and shift in specific ICE policies has
sparked a national political controversy.
Against this backdrop is a federal district court spilt on an issue that
demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling changing immigration law with a
prescribed, thirty-year old statute. The issue is whether a defendant who has
been charged with unlawful reentry into the United States may be labeled a
flight risk under the Bail Reform Act, due to risk of ICE detainment and deportation.5 Furthermore, whether this risk leaves no alternative but to deny
release pending trial.6 This issue has not yet been considered in the Fourth
Circuit, and has been met with conflicting resolution in other federal district
7

courts.

In this note, I will examine the stance taken by the United States District
Court in the Western District of Virginia in a case of first impression. In a

1. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf t,Fiscal Year 2018 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.

4. Id.at 2.
5. UnitedStatesv. Flores,No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2018).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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2018 decision, the court concluded that while the question of likely deportation is a relevant consideration in determining whether an individual is a
flight risk, it does not follow that detainment is the only condition available
to reasonably ensure a defendant's presence at trial.8 Thus, such an argument
is not in compliance with the language and structure of the Bail Reform Act.9
This decision has implications for a defendant's ability to provide for themselves and their families pending trial, and closes an easy avenue for denying
bail.
THE CASE
Angel Orlando Vasquez Flores, a citizen of Mexico, was charged with one
count of reentering the United States after deportation in violation of a federal
statute. 10 In the first appearance before the magistrate judge, the Government
argued Flores should be labeled a flight risk and denied pretrial release.1 1 This
request was based on a two-fold consideration. 12 First, the likelihood that
Flores would be subjected to a reinstated removal order because of his
charges.13 In addition, ICE had lodged a detainer against Flores, which increased the risk of deportation before trial.14 Because of these risks, the Government argued that the Bail Reform Act supported detention as the only
means available to "reasonably assure his appearance at trial in this matter."'"
Judge Joel C. Hoppe rejected this argument, stating that the Bail Reform
Act guidelines generally favor release over detainment.1 6 The court found
detainment could not be granted, as the Government failed to meet the prescribed preponderance of the evidence standard in proving that "no combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's presence at future
court proceedings."' 7
The case centered on the meaning of "risk of flight" in the Bail Reform
Statute, particularly the risk the defendant will "flee."' 8 The court found that
other evidence presented, standing alone, did not create a risk of flight.' 9
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
UnitedStates v. Flores, No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. DeBeir, 16 F. Supp.2d 592, 593 (D. Md. 1998)).
Id.at *2 (quoting UnitedStates v. Stewart, 19 F. App'x 46, 48 ( 4 ' Cir. 2001)).
Va.Aug. 3, 2018).
UnitedStates v. Flores, No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *2 (W.D.
Id.(citing United States v. Villanueva-Martinez,707 F. Supp.2d 855, 857 (N.D. Iowa 2010)).
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However, the Government argued this phrase also included the risk of ICE
detainment and deportation, and such a risk meant there is no other condition
to reasonably assure a defendant's appearance at trial. 20 Flores argued that
the term "serious risk" does not contemplate involuntary risk of flight, such
as deportation by ICE officials. 21 The court found the plain language interpretation of "flee" contemplates only volitional conduct, and that interpretation was supported by other provisions of the statute.22 The request for detainment was denied and Flores was released with an agreement to be subjected to GPS monitoring, a promise not to leave the judicial district, and a
promise to appear in court. 23
BACKGROUND
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 is a statutory, instructional guideline federal
judges use to determine whether an individual charged with a federal offense
will be released or detained prior to trial.24 When a defendant is granted bail,
he or she is released upon some promise to attend future proceedings.2 ' The
original Bail Reform Act of 1966 was enacted to combat the influence of a
defendant's wealth in the determination of release, and the resulting disadvantages associated with detainment.2 6 The
statute was amended in 1984 to
27
allow detention in limited circumstances.
There are six statutory conditions outlined in the Bail Reform Act, and at
least one must be in contention for a detention hearing to be granted.2 8 One
of these conditions is "a serious risk that such a person will flee., 29 For detainment to be granted, there must be a showing by a preponderance of evidence that "no combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's presence at future court proceedings."30 Several criteria are to be considered in determining whether such conditions exist including a defendant's
"history and characteristics." 3 1 If this finding is not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant is released "subject to the least re-

20. Id. (citing United States v. Ong, 762 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2010)).
21.

Id.

22. Id. at *4.
23. Id. at *1.
24. United States v. Flores,No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3,2018).
25. Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., R40221, Bail: An Overview of FederalCriminalLaw 1
(2017).

26. Id. at2-3.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Doyle, Supra Note 25, at 4.
Flores, 2018 WL 3715766, at *1.
18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2)(A) (2008).
Flores,2018 WL 3715766, at *2 (quoting Stewart, 19 F. App'x at 48)).
18 U.S.C. §3142(g)(3) (2008).
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strictive further condition, or combination of conditions that such judicial officer determines
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as re32
quired.
There are two key issues that federal district courts have diverged on that
will be the subject of our focus. The first is whether involuntary removal,
such as by ICE officials, is encompassed in the Bail Reform Act's condition
for serious risk of flight, or whether this term contemplates only volitional
movement.3 3 The second key question is whether this categorization, standing alone, is sufficient to hold that detainment is the only available option, as
no conditions of release will reasonably assure defendant's future appearance.

34

A minority of federal district courts have found that risk of removal by
ICE is sufficient to label defendants a flight risk, and to preclude finding of
alternate conditions that would reasonably ensure future appearance.35 In
United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez,a federal district court in Iowa held in
2012 that such a risk was akin to a "certainty" that defendants would be taken
into ICE custody and deported.36 In that case, the court declined to distinguish
whether the source of flight risk was from voluntary or involuntary conduct.37
Instead, the court emphasized weighing the "certainty of removal" for individual defendants. 38 A defendant's prior criminal history is an important consideration, particularly if the unlawful reentry offense is coupled with a previous removal for a felony conviction.3 9 The court noted that the existence of
a valid enforcement removal order informs a decision for detention or removal, not an ICE detainer.4 °
In a 2010 case from Georgia, the court pointed to the defendant's likelihood of removal from the country and subsequent bar on reentry as a factor
in finding no alternative conditions for release.41 In UnitedStates v. Ong, the
defendant was indicted with conspiracy to violate and violation of the Arms
32.

18 U.S.C. §3142 (c)(B) (2008).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Flores, 2018 WL 3715766, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. (citing United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 910 F. Supp.2d 1155, 1158-59 (N.D. Iowa

2012)).
37.

United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 910 F. Supp.2d 1155, 1160 (N.D. Iowa 2012).

38. Id. at 1158-59.
39. Id. at 1159 (citing United States v. Lozano, CRNo. 1:09cr158-WKW, 2009 WL 3052279, at *6
(M.D.AIa. Sept. 21, 2009)).
40. Id. (citing United States v. Castro-Inzunza, No. 3:11cr00418-MA, 2012 WL 1952652, at *7
(D.Or. May. 20, 2012)).
41. Flores, 2018 WL 3715766, at *2 (citing UnitedStates v. Ong, 762 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1363 (N.D.
Ga. 2010)).
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Export Control Act, and conspiring to violate money laundering laws.4" The
defendant was initially granted pretrial release, which the Georgia District
court revoked.4 3 The Government's main argument for revocation of release
centered on the defendant's lack of ties to the United States, his extensive
ties to the Philippines, and his frequent travel to other countries. 4 The court
acknowledged the potential paradox between the language of the Bail Reform Act and efforts of the Executive Branch when considering defendant's
ICE detainer, but declined to consider it further. 45 The court revoked release
citing the defendant's deportable status as well as other characteristics suggestive of a flight risk.4 6
However, a majority of federal courts have found that a serious risk of
flight includes only voluntary movement, and that a risk of involuntary
movement, alone, is not sufficient for pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act.4 7 The court in the case at bar also adopted this position, outlining
four major points of support.
Statutory interpretation of the Bail Reform Act can shed light on what
Congress intended "flee" to entail.4a The first step is to determine whether
the term has a plain and unambiguous meaning.4 9 If it does, that definition
should be adopted.5" A term has plain meaning when it "bears only one reasonable interpretation."'" However, in determining the existence of ambiguity, the term should be interpreted in light of the surrounding text and viewed
in the broader context of the statute.5 2 Common definitions of "flee" broadly
support the concept of running away, or escaping from danger or detection,
which are voluntary acts.53
Furthermore, Congress could have carved out an exception and listed "removable aliens" as a group excluded from consideration of release.5 4 Instead,
the statute specifically outlines the procedure in which non-citizens are to be
temporarily detained.5 5 The judicial offer "shall order the detainment" for no
42. UnitedStates v. Ong, 762 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
43. Id.
44. Id.at 1357.

45. Id.at 1360.
46. Id.at 1363.
47.

Flores,No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *1.

48. Id.at *4.
49. Id. at *3 (quoting Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2006)).
50. Id. (quoting Raplee v. UnitedStates, 842 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2016)).

51.

Id.

52.
53.

Id.at *3 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
United States v. Flores, No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2018)

h
(quoting United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334, 1338 n.2 (10" Cir. 2017)).

54.

Id.(quoting Ailon-Ailon 875 F.3d at1338)).

55. Id.
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more than ten days and the Government's attorney is to be directed to notify
the appropriate official. 56 If the official "fails or declines to take such person
into custody during that period, such person shall be treated in accordance
with the other provisions of this section., 57 The statute also delineates five
separate federal offenses that create a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required. 8 Unlawful reentry is not among the listed offenses.5 9
Finally, the statute instructs that judges shall weigh a series of considerations when determining whether there are "conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required., 60 Among these are
"the history and characteristics of the person, including the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct
...
and record concerning appearance at court proceedings."'6' These considerations can be categorized as a defendant's own individual traits.6 2 The court
in the case at bar also urged consideration of the potential threat of a defendant being involuntarily removed from his family as a factor to evidence a
finding that an individual has an incentive to flee and avoid further proceedings. Thus, while these factors are helpful in weighing release conditions,
the court argues they are not determinative of a finding of pretrial detainment.
64

ANALYSIS
This decision correctly applied the Bail Reform Act. Ultimately, the resolution is found in a simple application of the plain language of "flee" and the
statute's surrounding context.

56.

18 U.S.C. §3142 (d)(l)(B)(2) (2008)); But see United States v. Kraper, 847 F.Supp.2d 350

(D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that the Adam Walsh Act amendments to the Bail Reform Act as set out in 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) constitute a facial violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
57. Id.
58. Flores, 2018 WL 3715766, at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3142(e)(3) (2008)).
59. Id. (citing Ailon-Ailon 875 F.3d at 1138)).
60. 18 U.S.C. §3142 (g) (2008).
61. 18 U.S.C. §3142 (g)(3)(A) (2008).

62. Flores, 2018 WL 3715766, at *5.
63. Id. (quoting States v. Benitez-Elvira, No. 1:14cr391, 2014 WL 6896142, at *2-4 & n.9
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2014))).
64. Id.(citing UnitedStates v.Santos-Flores,794 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (9th Cir.2015)).
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Congress did not distinguish the category of removable aliens as a group
excluded from consideration of release. 65 Similarly, Congress failed to list
unlawful reentry among a group of offenses that create a rebuttable presumption in favor of detainment.6 6 These decisions support the contention that a
defendant's offense of unlawful reentry, and status as removable alien do not
create an inherent risk of flight. 67 Finally, the statute prompts judges to examine a list of a defendant's individual traits when determining conditions
for release. 68 This evidence further supports the contention that Congress intended an individualized analysis for risk of voluntary flight.69 This issue has
not yet been raised in the Fourth Circuit, but I would encourage the adoption
of the majority position when it arises.
The minority position, which has led to a split in the federal district courts,
fails to adequately examine the structure of the statute or even attempt to
uncover the legislative intent behind it. An attempt to weigh the certainty of
deportation is an exercise in futility, as it ultimately amounts to nothing more
than a guess. Nevertheless, the recently revised and stricter enforcement policies of ICE may lead to an increase in similar cases and an uptick in adoption
of the minority position. The Bail Reform Act's thirty-year-old language is
arguably at odds with recent policy adoptions, which explicitly direct officials to target removable aliens charged with unresolved criminal offenses.
Furthermore, the rhetoric surrounding immigration offenses has turned into
a debate about national security. There is an undeniable tension between the
branches of government and an uncertain resolution. Congress may choose
to revise the Bail Reform Act, which could provide a clearer interpretation
and a response to executive branch policies. However, the courts must interpret the law as currently prescribed, and not allow perceived threats or implicit bias to justify an unwarranted deviation from it.
This appears to be a simple decision with a relatively minor legal impact.
However, there are real consequences for the affected population. Between
2008 and 2010, 97,635 individuals were charged with a federal immigration
offense.7 0 Ninety-one percent of these defendants were illegal aliens and only
twelve percent were granted pretrial release. 7 1 This is compared to a thirty-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. (citing Ailon-Ailon 875 F.3d at 1338)).
Id. at *5.
United States v. Flores,No. 5:18-mj-00043, 2018 WL 3715766, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2018).

70. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ239243,
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008-2010, 3 (2012)).

71.

PRETRIAL RELEASE

AND

Id.
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six percent average pretrial release rate for all defendants with cases in federal court in the same time frame.72 Property offenders enjoyed the highest
release rate at seventy-one percent, while defendants charged with violent
crime were released thirty percent of the time, just ahead of immigration offenders.73 The average length of detention for immigration offenders denied
pretrial release increased from seventy-two days in 2008, to eighty-two days
in 2009, and finally to eighty-six days in 2010. 74 That is an average of nearly
three months. Lastly, only ten percent of defendants identified as illegal aliens were granted release, compared to a forty-three percent rate for legal
aliens and a fifty-five percent rate for U.S. citizens.75
These statistics demonstrate the reality of poor pretrial release rates for
undocumented federal offenders, particularly those who face immigration offenses. While it is impossible to know how each determination was made, it
is possible that the minority view contributed to these numbers. The Bail Reform Act favors release over detainment, but it allows detainment in limited
circumstances for defendants who are flight risks or pose a safety risk. It also
creates a rebuttable presumption against release for certain offenses, which
do not include immigration offenses. Therefore, it is fair to speculate that at
least a portion of those denied release were denied, in whole or part, due to
their status as a removable alien.
Striking the balance between the reasonable assurance of a defendant's future court appearance and protecting individual freedom is a difficult task.
Yet, denial of pretrial release has major implications on a defendant's ability
to work, to access education and to provide for themselves and their families.
An average three-month detainment can be catastrophic. Courts should consider the impact of detainment when deciding which approach to adopt on
this issue.
Finally, this case note has focused specifically upon the denial of pretrial
release for defendants who have been charged with unlawful reentry into the
United States. It is worth noting that the same question is being raised in other
federal and state cases with undocumented defendants. In 2015, a New Jersey
woman facing shoplifting charges was denied admittance into a pretrial intervention program, because her status as an undocumented immigrant meant

72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 1.
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she could not be adequately supervised through a diversion program. 6 The
New Jersey Superior Court of Appeals later reversed the finding and allowed
the woman to enroll in the program.7 7
CONCLUSION
The court in this case made the right call by applying the language of the
Bail Reform Act as written. However, the growing tension between the executive branch's enforcement of immigration and the judiciary's application
of an arguably incompatible statute makes this an area of the law to keep an
eye on. While immigration is a polarizing topic, the courts should not interpret the Bail Reform Act differently in light of the executive branch's policy
of strict immigration enforcement. Undocumented federal offenders already
face poor outcomes when it comes to pretrial release, and the minority position provides an easy avenue to deny bail. Detainment should not be taken
lightly, as it has serious consequences for defendants and their families. A
federal judge should find detainment only after a proper, individualized analysis in accord with the language and structure of the Bail Reform Act.

76. State v. Gonzalez, No. A-4068-13T2, 2015 WL 2164807, *1, *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May
11,2015).
77. Id. at *4.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2021

9

